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Abstract 
We show empirically that aid given to poor developing countries enhances growth and 
reduces emigration once several dynamically interacting effects of aid are taken into 
account in a system of equations. We estimate equations for net immigration flows as a 
share of the labour force and GDP per capita growth and also for all their regressors 
including remittances and official development aid. We use dynamic panel data methods 
for a sample of poor countries with GDP per capita below $1200 (2000) for which aid is 
about 9.5% of GDP. The partial effects in these regressions are as follows. Remittances 
enhance net immigration, savings, public expenditure on education and growth, but 
reduce tax revenues, all as a share of GDP. Net immigration enhances labour force 
growth and the savings ratio. Official development aid decreases the savings ratio and the 
per capita GDP growth rate, but it increases investment, public expenditure on education 
and literacy and also labour force growth. Then we integrate all equations to a dynamic 
system and run a simulation. The result is an endogenous migration hump with several 
peaks. In a counterfactual simulation we double aid with the result that for more than a 
hundred years migration is reduced and the GDP per capita is enhanced, because the 
positive effects of aid on investment and education dominate the negative direct effects of 
aid on growth and the unfavourable effects on savings, tax revenues, and labour force 
growth. 
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Introduction 
We deal with two widely discussed questions regarding poor countries in a new way. 
Does aid enhance growth and does it reduce migration? Both questions have been 
discussed separately and conclusions have been drawn on the basis of single equation 
regressions. As aid may not only have direct effects captured in these regressions but also 
indirect ones we believe it is a better approach to analyze these questions in terms of 
systems of simultaneous equations taking into account all direct and indirect effects. We 
want to deal with both issues simultaneously by way of estimating several equations 
separately and integrating them into a simultaneous equation system for the purpose of 
running simulations. Counterfactual exercises like doubling aid are then easily carried out 
as well. 
   Since the early and much disputed findings of a reduction in savings rates – for 
example by Papanek (1972) - some economists have seen this as tantamount to reduced 
investments and therefore growth using the equality of savings and investment as learned 
in the first principles for closed economy economics although developing countries are 
open economies with large capital inflows and changing differences between investment 
and savings. The recent literature on aid and growth before and after the last round - 
initiated by Burnside and Dollar (2000) and disputed heavily thereafter again (see Perkins 
et al. 2006, Roodman 2007b and Kourtellos et al. 2007) - has focused on the effects of aid 
in growth regressions without taking into account the effects aid may have on the 
regressors such as investment in physical and human capital and employment growth. In 
spite of some correlation between investment and savings all the variables show different 
reactions to changes in aid (see Doucouliagos and Paldam 2006) and have some mutual 
dependence.  Therefore it seems preferable to analyze the direct impacts of aid on 
savings, investment and growth and other variables first separately in regressions and 
then consider all effects together in a simulation analysis using a system of all the 
estimated equations. This allows us to consider the direct and indirect effects of aid on 
growth and also those from GDP per capita on migration and remittances simultaneously 
with some other feedback effects.   
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   The effect of aid on migration is much more difficult to trace then the aid effects 
because of the complicated relation between migration and growth, sometimes called the 
migration hump, and therefore needs a longer explanation. The ‘migration hump’ or 
‘emigration curve’ describes the idea that over time and with increasing income countries 
may move from increasing to decreasing flows of emigration and then to immigration. 
The question of the existence of such a hump is relevant for several reasons. First, 
emigration could be stemmed to some extent through development in the absence of a 
positive relation between development and emigration. However, if there is a positive and 
stable relation because of the affordability of migration costs, development may lead to 
more emigration first, before falling perhaps only much later. In particular, if more 
official development aid - as requested recently by the former UN Secretary General Kofi 
Annan (see UN 2005) - achieves more growth and development this seemingly would 
also help to reduce migration in the absence of an invariable migration hump, but not in 
its presence.2 Second, emigration has an impact on the growth of the population and the 
labour force, which is well known to have a negative impact in growth regressions. If 
emigration follows a hump, labour force and population growth may have an inverted 
hump and therefore growth rates may have long waves if these effects are strong enough 
relative to other effects. Lower migration may then lead to higher labour force growth 
which in turn may reduce levels and growth rates in the long run, even if the effects of 
aid on growth and other variables are favourable in the short and medium run. Again, 
there is a need for a simultaneous consideration of aid, savings, migration, labour force 
growth, remittances, GDP per capita growth, and other variables because of the many 
direct and indirect effects and their interactions evolving probably non-linear ways.     
   What is the existing evidence for a migration hump? Easterlin (1961) found a negative 
relation between income and emigration for European countries of origin before WWI. 
There is no part in the relation where higher income leads to more emigration.3  Zelinsky 
(1971) presents a hump shaped curve based on ‘scattered evidence and the deeper logic 
of socioeconomic history’. Akerman (1976) drew an inverted u-shape function based on 
                                                 
2
 See Böhning (1994), Olesen (2002), Stalker (2002) de Haas (2007), Skeldon (2008) and for an extensive 
discussion of these issues and their origins.  
3
 This is in line with his argument that migration was mainly driven by the economic situation in the United 
States and push factors were of little relevance.  
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data for Sweden 1851-1960. Faini and Venturini (1993, 1994, 2008) find that migration 
as a share of the population is an inverted u-function of GDP per capita for four countries 
in Southern Europe; the function has a peak somewhere between  $3500 and $4500 (in 
prices of 1985). Hatton and Williamson (1994) found an inverted u-shape function for the 
emigration rate, er = -0.35+2.66t-0.27t2, for eleven European countries in the period 
1860-1913. They attributed the upward sloping part to population pressure, 
industrialization4 and past emigration, and the downward sloping part to wage 
convergence. Fischer et al. (1997) provide some data plots for five OECD countries. 
Rotte et al. (1997) find a positive impact of Gross National Product per capita in 
purchasing power parity terms on the number of asylum seekers in Germany from 17 
countries 1985-94. de Haan (1999, p.20) indicates some episodes of successful regional 
development in India, China, Mexico and Japan, during which gross emigration 
increased. Vogler and Rotte (2000) find a hump for migration from developing countries 
to Germany related to the GDP per capita and its squared value. Hatton and Williamson 
(2005) found a positive effect of relative wages of the country of origin to that of 
destination on migration for African countries. Lucas (2005) presents bivariate evidence - 
relating emigration and GDP per capita with a negative slope - against the idea of an 
upward sloping part of the hump for LDCs.5 Dumont et al. (2007) regress the stock of 
emigrants in the OECD from country of origin i, with education e and gender g as a share 
of the population of the origin countries on the average GDP per capita for the years 
1985-2000. This cross-country regression shows a positive sign for people with primary 
education as one would expect in a migration hump. Clark et al. (2007) using fixed 
effects estimation methods find that there is an inverted u-shape which yields a positive 
impact of GDP per capita on migration to the USA when evaluated at the mean value for 
Africa, but a negative value when evaluated at the mean value for Latin American 
countries. 
                                                 
4
 Another approach based on multi-sector thinking is Martin and Taylor (1996). They select assumptions 
for trade models under which trade liberalization will lead to wage inequality and therefore encourage 
migration in the short run. Assuming that trade reduces migration in the long run trade liberalization might 
contribute to a migration hump in theory.     
5
 In favour of the upward sloping part of the hump are household data for migration within Vietnam 
(Nguyen et al. (2008)). This paper will concentrate on macroeconomic dynamics though.  
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   Some of these studies use only pooled OLS estimates or are related to data from the 
European migration to the USA from countries that were among the richest in the world. 
For these it remains an open question, whether or not these results would also hold over 
time and for flows of migrants from poor developing countries. Others though have used 
fixed effects and this so-called within estimator has a clear time dimension aspect. Our 
overall judgement is that the above mentioned studies provide strong indications of the 
existence of a migration hump when poor countries are considered using fixed effects 
methods. However, we also think that it would be premature to conclude that the 
existence of a hump is sufficient to exclude the possibility that more growth through 
more aid, leads to less migration. The reason is that such an interpretation might overlook 
the possibility that a migration hump or emigration curve is not a fixed constellation but 
rather an endogenous curve that may shift when circumstances change. Aid may have an 
effect not only on the GDP per capita, the variable on the horizontal axis of the hump, but 
also on the migration, the y-axis variable of the hump, because both are dependent on 
regressors, which may be affected by aid. By implication, the hump is endogenous and 
may shift. The true challenge then is the question where and how the hump shifts. It 
seems to us that the question can not be answered without extensive modelling of the 
most important aspects and analysis of the impacts of changes in aid on the determinants 
of net migration and the levels and growth rates of GDP per capita.6          
  Our contribution is as follows. First, we show that the quadratic time trend of Hatton 
and Williamson (1994) also appears for poor developing countries. Extending the 
emigration regression with a quadratic time trend in order to include the economic 
arguments, which can explain net migration, we find that results for an upward sloping 
part of the hump using GDP per capita remain inconclusive and not robust when looking 
only at a single migration equation. The idea of the hump is established when using 
savings as a share of GDP as a development indicator in the migration regression jointly 
with considering the simulation of a model that endogenizes all regressors of the 
migration and growth regressions. Savings ratios have a positive impact on emigration as 
                                                 
6
 Below we will assume that aid is fungible. If states get the aid requested by the UN the receiving states 
will move some of there money elsewhere. It will become clear below, that this is not meant to deny the 
role of tying of aid. We will make explicit the assumptions about how much fungibility and how much 
tying there is.    
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the traditional income difference arguments does. This is an indication of imperfect 
capital markets and credit rationing as savings is the natural way out for those who do not 
get credit to invest in migration. Worker remittances on the other hand allow people to 
stay at home where they consume or invest the remittances. Only a joint dynamic 
analysis for all these forces can show whether or not there is a hump. Therefore we also 
run regressions explaining all the regressors in the migration equation. In many 
regressions we find effects of aid. The most well known ones are those in the growth 
regression and, in the literature completely separated from the previous, in those for 
savings and investment. We find these effects for our sample too, but beyond that we find 
effects in the equation for labour force growth, public expenditure on education and 
literacy. 
   Running simulations for the whole system and thereby being to the best of our 
knowledge the first who analyze many effects of aid simultaneously, we find a migration 
hump and long waves of growth driven by the impact of migration and remittances on 
labour force growth, savings, investment, public expenditure on education and literacy. In 
short, we reestablish the idea of the migration hump using the savings ratio as a 
development indicator together with simulations from an empirical growth model taking 
into account open economy aspects of migration and, implicitly, capital movements and 
trade.   
   Next, we simulate the effects of approximately doubling the effects of aid. This makes 
explicit what the multiple effects of aid are when the result is compared to the base run of 
the simulations. It is particularly interesting because of the skepticism from the literature 
on aid-and-growth regressions and the aid and accumulation regressions (see the meta 
studies of Doucouliagos and Paldam 2006, 2008). If for growth regressions the evidence 
is mixed, and investment is enhanced by aid whereas savings may be reduced, the 
divergence of investment and savings indicate higher net foreign debt. The increase in 
investment and also education variables may outweigh the negative effects in the growth 
regression. The migration hump then is not a fixed relation along which the economies 
move more or less quickly depending on aid but rather the whole relation is endogenous 
and we show how it shifts when aid is enhanced.   
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   Our results imply good and bad news. The seemingly bad news for those hoping to 
stem migration through development is that there is a hump with three peaks and 
emigration might increase first. The good news is that for our panel average the higher 
two of the peaks are just behind us in the years 1989 and 2005; a lower one follows in 
2073 and therefore could in principle enhance migration through higher growth. The 
critical point though is where the hump moves when aid is enhanced. The change in 
migration then is a combination of a move along and a shift of the hump. We show that 
the hump gets smaller through the multiple effects of aid causing lower savings and a 
higher GDP per capita for more than a hundred years. Therefore, for a long period there 
is more GDP per capita growth followed though by a period with less growth. For about 
140 years there is less emigration until the end of our simulation period when remittances 
get negative. The good times of growth stem from the positive effects of aid on 
investment which is going to be financed through aid and foreign debt while savings 
ratios are decreasing. The growth dampening effect of larger labour force growth follows 
with some delay through more aid, growth and less emigration although it is itself 
weakened through more literacy. The positive first period is very long and gives these 
countries a lot of time to generate structural breaks towards a better development 
although aid may weaken the political pressure and incentives to change policies.    
 
Methodology 
The crucial question for the analysis is whether we should carry it out for developing 
countries with high income and migration or for those with low income and migration. 
We have data since 1960, where migration from the poor essentially started (Hatton and 
Williamson 2003), and the suspicion is that the hump occurs for countries with relative 
low income (de Haas 2007). We do not have the data for the time when the now 
relatively rich developing countries where sufficiently poor to exhibit a hump. The 
selection of countries then is based on data availability with respect to remittances, 
literacy, aid, and GDP.7 This results in a sample of 108 countries. In earlier work we 
found that countries below $1200 have lower growth rates. Moreover, Boone (1996) 
                                                 
7
 If data availability of countries is related to being poor then there may exist an even poorer set of 
countries for which we do not have the data.   
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briefly reports having found positive effects of aid on investment only for poor countries, 
which is important for our approach of integrating growth with investment regressions 
and other equations for the purpose of simulation, explained below. Therefore we prefer 
to split the sample and look only at the poor part in this sample for which the migration 
hump is a reasonable idea.8 We carry out the analysis for 52 countries9 with per capita 
income below $1200 in prices of the year 2000. For these we have data from the World 
Development Indicators for 1960 to 2005, which are explained in an appendix. The data 
structure therefore is one of a panel with 46 time periods and 52 cross-section units. In 
this sample aid is about 9.5% of GDP a therefore much larger than in the samples of other 
papers. We believe that its effects then should not be ‘too small to be detected 
statistically’(Roodman 2008).   
   As we are dealing with a macroeconomic issue we want to recognize the success of the 
vector-autoregressive econometric models (Greene 2003) in the sense that we take into 
account lagged dependent variables, and we take into account other regressors when they 
are in accordance with economic theory and evidence. The combination of a panel and 
lagged dependent variables brings us into the realm of dynamic panel data methods. As 
our problem is an inherently dynamic one in which the time dimension is more important 
than the cross section information using a fixed effects or ‘within‘ estimator is in 
principal a straightforward choice when the time dimension of the data, T, is sufficiently 
long. Moreover, for all equations we have tested and rejected the redundancy of fixed 
effects and also tested random versus fixed effects with the result that fixed effects are 
preferable. Fixed effect estimators have a downward bias of the coefficient of the lagged 
dependent variable of the order of magnitude of 1/T, whereas ordinary least squares 
estimation overestimates that coefficient. According to Judson and Owen (1999) when T 
is about thirty fixed effects estimation is reasonable. However, Baltagi (2005, Chap.8) 
points out that the bias then still may be as high as 20%. Therefore we have always tried 
out the fixed effects estimator and compared it to the GMM systems estimator of 
Arellano and Bover (1995) using their orthogonal deviation calculation method. We 
prefer it to the fixed effects estimator if (i) the latter results in a higher coefficient of the 
                                                 
8
 Kourtellos et al. (2007) split their sample according to ethno linguistic fractionalization using Bayesian 
tree regression.   
9
 See Appendix for a list with the names of the countries. 
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lagged dependent variable than the fixed-effects estimator and a lower one than the OLS 
estimator, and (ii) the Hansen-Sargan J-statistic is not too high or too low because of the 
over-identifying constraints (see Roodman 2007a for a discussion). Exceptions to this 
rule are made if its first-difference property due to the lack of calculating a constant 
results in strange simulation results. In the latter case we choose the fixed effects 
estimator which mostly has only slightly smaller coefficients for the lagged dependent 
variable.   
   The core of the model are equations for net immigration as a share of the labour force, 
GDP per capita, labour force growth, ratios for remittances, savings, investment, tax 
revenues, public expenditure on education, and aid, all as a share of GDP, interest rates, 
and literacy as a share of the population. In addition to the core of the model, we use US 
interest rates in the equation for remittances, world income in the growth equation and 
OECD income in the migration equation and the aid equation. For these variables we 
provide only simple auxiliary equations as is the habit in dynamic stochastic general 
equilibrium models (DSGE; see for example Acosta et al 2007). Nevertheless, with these 
three variables we have gone through the whole trajectory of checking for unit roots, 
estimating the vector-autoregressive model (VAR), determining optimal lag length, 
checking for stability, testing for cointegration and estimation of an error correction 
model. Here it turns out that the US interest rates and the OECD growth are exogenous 
because the cointegrating vector has no significant impact on them. Estimation of the 
autoregressive model for the log of the world GDP with US interest rates and OECD 
growth rates and a time trend after elimination of insignificant lags and autoregressive 
equations for US interest rates and OECD per capita GDP complete the model. The 
lagged dependent variables in these equations introduce a bias. But the estimator is 
consistent as the Breusch-Godfrey test shows that there is no serial correlation. Having by 
far more than 30 degrees of freedom the bias will be small enough to allow for least 
squares estimation (Ramanathan 2001). Standard errors for these equations are 
heterogeneity and serial correlation consistent (Newey West HAC).    
   Having estimated the fourteen equations for migration and growth and all their 
regressors using lagged dependent variables, forward simulation can be useful for several 
purposes. First, deciding between similar regressions simulation within a system 
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sometimes yield weird results allowing excluding some of the alternatives. As forecasting 
within and out of sample normally is also an important aspect, we also checked the usual 
forecast criteria (see Table A.1 in an appendix of the working paper version) and whether 
or not our preferred regression is close to the actual observations when the simulation 
goes out of sample in 2005, a relatively good year in terms of economic performance of 
the world economy, and sometimes we used this as deciding criterion when several others 
were similar for the candidate regressions.    
   Second, if one wants to know whether or not there is a migration hump one needs to 
simulate forward beyond the limits of data availability on the basis of estimated equations 
to see how non-linear curves evolve and whether or not they remain within reasonable 
values for a sufficiently long time. In general, one can almost always remain on the safe 
side of plausibility by specifying regression equations in accordance with assumptions 
ensuring stable steady states in growth theory.10  However, for migration equations there 
are many results suggesting that emigration goes from increasing to decreasing values 
and movements into immigration. This may result in non-linearities in migration 
equations in particular if emigration curves or humps exist. The question then is whether 
or not these non-linearities from plausible regression results make the model simulations 
explode or implode or neither of the two for sufficiently long time. We found that in our 
simulations this never happened before the year 2150 when remittances became negative. 
In other words, the non-linearities of our model result in a long wave for about hundred 
and fifty years. In the first phase of this long wave we get development with increasing 
emigration as a share of the labour force, decreasing labour force growth and increasing 
growth rates of the GDP per capita. In the second phase, we get decreasing emigration as 
a share of the labour force with slightly increasing labour force growth rates, and falling 
growth rates of GDP per capita. This clearly highlights also that labour force growth is of 
eminent importance and illustrates that our model exhibits a very long structural change 
rather than a steady state. An interesting case combining the first and a second point – 
selection by simulation and simulation of complex non-linearities - is that under a certain 
                                                 
10
 Note that the standard justification for steady state models of growth is that otherwise models would 
explode or implode, but that this is rarely observed in reality. However, there are also non-steady state 
models and if a models ex- or implodes after several hundred or thousand years this need not be a reason 
for concern, because no country will escape structural breaks for such a long time. One may want to call 
steady states a ‘long run’, but there is no necessity to limit the long run to steady states.    
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specification of the migration equation we came close to a net emigration of more than 
4% of the labour force for forty years. Such values can be realistic for some time but are 
unlikely for long periods for which we would expect migration rates either to return to 
smaller values, or a region getting (close to) empty more quickly from some time 
onwards. However, ultimately differences between several specifications of migration 
equations lead to differences of the length and strength of the emigration hump phase, but 
not to a qualitatively different form.  
   Third, once we have simulation results we can compare them to counterfactual 
simulations such as doubling aid. In (UN 2005) there are two suggestions. First, in order 
to pay for the Millenium goals aid at the amount of one third to one half of the GDP of 
the poor countries is needed. This would imply increasing aid from almost 10% of the 
GDP of the poor receiving countries to 40 or 60%. This seems to be a bit unrealistic. 
Second, there is a suggestion to double aid. We will double the constant of our aid 
regression and thereby approximately double aid as a share of GDP from 0.095 to 0.185.          
   In order to explain this in greater detail and also the reaction of and feedback from 
other variables, we go to present the ideas and results of all regressions. We do this in one 
step to keep the exposition short.            
 
Estimation results 
We first regress the data for net immigration (including return migration), nm, as a share 
of the labour force11, l, on a quadratic time trend, t and t2, for the period 1960-2005, 10 
five yearly observations, and 52 countries and a total of 508 observations. The result is as 
follows, with p-values,12 the marginal significance level, in parentheses.  
 
nm/l = -0.0039 -0.00090T +0.000014T2       
                       (0.11)  (0.0003)    (0.0056); Adj.R2 = 0.457. DW-statistic: 0.97 
 
                                                 
11
 For all our purposes it is useful to correct variables for country size. When explaining volumes of 
migration one may want to abstain from this as is the case in gravity equations (see Lewer and van den 
Berg 2008). As more than 75% of migrants to the USA are in the age group of 14 - 65 (Clark et al. 2004) 
and the purpose of the migration is work, it seems most plausible to consider immigrants as a share of the 
labour force, a variable that is used in the growth model part too.  
12
 Based on panel corrected standard errors in regard to serial correlation, Period SUR (PCSE)). We use 
fixed effects with cross-section weights (estimated or feasible GLS) to correct for heteroscedasticity.  
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Net emigration is expected to have a maximum after thirty two years and to vanish after 
seventy years according to the quadratic time trend estimation.13 As the regression refers 
to the period 1960 to 2005 the maximum emigration should have happened to occur 
already in the year 1991 and emigration should vanish in about 2030.14  
   So far the result suggests that we have a migration hump with a peak in the past. Of 
course, basic econometric lessons would warn us against an omitted variable bias when 
using only the time variable, and the adjusted R-squared indeed suggests some space for 
improvements. Moreover, the Durbin-Watson statistic is low either because of the low 
number of time periods, T=10, or because of mis-specification. This is what we look at 
next. We write down the result of a system GMM estimate following Arellano and Bover 
(1995) as a level equation with an undetermined constant.   
 
NM/L = c11 - 0.18NM(-5)/L(-5) +2.97(LOG(GDPPC)-LOG(OEC)) + 0.73(LOG(GDPPC)-LOG(OEC))2    
     (0.06)      (0.002)    (0.0014)  
 
+0.058(LOG(GDPPC)-LOG(OEC))3  + 1.29 WR(-10)/GDP(-10) – 1.36(WR/GDP)2  +  
  (0.0013)       (0.0000)   (0.006) 
 
+12.8(WR(-5)/GDP(-5))2  - 19(WR(-10)/GDP(-10))2  - 0.00118SAVGDP(-3)    (1)  
(0.0000)   (0.000)        (0.0001) 
 
Per.: 4 (1990 2005). Countr.: 20. Obs.: 46. S.E.E..: 0.012655. J-stat.: 23.69. Instr. Rank 30. p (J)15: 0.31 
 
As indicated above, the method used does not provide us with a constant. The lagged 
dependent variable normally is interpreted to reflect network effects (see for example 
Hatton and Williamson 1998, Chap.4, and Mayda 2007) and expected to have a positive 
sign. We get a positive sign for an OLS estimate, but a negative one when using fixed 
effects or the Panel GMM reported. The negative sign may stem from migration that is 
caused by natural disasters or political conflict including war and civil war. These may be 
negatively correlated with similar events five years later. In addition, if in a network a 
person has financed the costs of migration for one person then, for relatively poor 
                                                 
13
 This relation is plotted in Figure A1. Figures and Tables named ‘A…’ can be found in an appendix of the 
working paper version.  
14
 In a similar regression for the share of manufacturing in GDP we find a peak for 1990 or 1991 as 
suggested by Clark et al. (2004). The estimation result from a fixed effects estimation is manugdp = 9.5 + 
0.01T2-0.00024T3. t-values are 43, 13 and 12 respectively. Periods: 46 (1960-2005). Countries: 52. obs.: 
1574. Adj.R-squared: 0.75. Although emigration and the share of manufacturing follow an inverted u-shape 
pattern over time, they are not significantly correlated with each other in our sample, with and without 
inclusion of our other regressors.    
15
 This p-value belongs to the Hansen (or Sargan) J-statistic. 
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countries like those in our sample, the probability that another one can be financed five 
years later may be very low and affected negatively. This may be different for large 
stocks of migrants - of which we do not have the adequate data though – when such 
uncertainties and fluctuations are averaged out over a large number of people. Our result 
is more plausible for small stocks of migrants with much temporary migration as Hatton 
and Williamson (2002) report for Africans in the USA constituting a small network 
whose behaviour may resemble that of single persons in the presence of fluctuations.16  
   The second argument is the backwardness in GDP per capita, GDPpc, relative to that of 
the OECD, OEC. Most international migrants in the meanwhile go to OECD countries. 
However, many do not but go to richer neighboring countries. Only 15% of the migrants 
to the OECD come from low-income countries (Skeldon 2008). Countries that are 
loosing people to the OECD directly are willing to allow for immigrants from other 
countries. These countries in turn are willing to allow for immigrants from the next 
poorer countries. This constitutes a chain from rich to poor countries, where the incentive 
essentially stems from the rich end of the chain. In this perspective the GDP per capita in 
the OECD reflects the income that can be earned in the upper end of the chain. This 
income difference is only a rough indicator of what the migrant gets as an income change 
when changing the country of his location. Of course, he may not exactly have the 
average income before and after migration and the probabilities of getting a job in the 
new and old locations may differ but still the income difference between the places of 
origin and destination is a good proxy for the revenue gain of the national and 
international migrants since the work of Todaro (1969) (see Mayda 2007 for an extensive 
discussion of modern literature).17 According to our combination of data and simulations 
the gap increased from -3.4 to -3.7 in the period 1960-1990, and falls slightly afterwards; 
then catching up takes place in our simulations until a value of (-2.96) in 2155 when our 
simulation ends.18 Therefore this part of the incentives for migration increased until 1990 
                                                 
16
 Hatton and Williamson (1998, chap.4) report strong volatility for migration streams before WWI.  
17
 Hatton and Williamson use wages instead of income in their papers. Note that under a Cobb-Douglas 
function wages are proportional to per capita GDP. 
18
 Figure A2a shows the plot of the arguments as in the regression for the relevant range of our simulations 
presented below. It has a u-shaped form along which the economy moves as indicated in the main text: first 
to the left, then to the right. 
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(see also Hatton and Williamson (2003)), then remained constant and thereafter is 
reduced.  
   The next argument appearing in the form of current and lagged, linear and quadratic 
terms are worker remittances as a share of GDP.19 This is what those who are left behind 
by the migrants get. For the European migration to the US before WWI Hatton and 
Williamson (2003) emphasize that remittances financed further emigration. Modern 
migration theory emphasizes that this money can also be used to solve the market 
imperfections like insurance problems and related credit constraints (see Stark and Bloom 
1985, Taylor 1999 and Rapoport and Docquier 2006). In our case this effect reduces 
emigration in a slightly non-linear way that is close to a one-to-one relation though (see 
Figure A2b). As worker remittances as a share of GDP are between zero and 5 per cent 
they reduce net emigration by about the same number of percentage points. This makes 
sense because reducing problems from market imperfections makes sense only if some 
members of the family want to stay in the country of origin. The effect emphasized by 
modern theory therefore dominates the one of financing additional migration. 
Unfortunately the remittance data are received payments. We do not have the data for 
remittances paid or only versions including non-migrant labour income from abroad. This 
may lead to an omitted variable bias, at least for countries with two-way migration. 
However, to the best of our knowledge, earlier regressions with migration as a dependent 
variable did not take into account remittances at all, although they are the return of the 
family decision for those who stay at home according to the new economics of labour 
migration. Even if we are missing remittances paid we provide an improvement to the 
state of the art here.    
   The last regressor is the savings ratio as of three years ago. In poor countries with less 
than $1200 per year or $100 per month it will hardly be possible to pay migration costs 
out of current income even if reconsidered in terms of purchasing power parity. It is 
necessary to save first. Whereas the income difference and remittances represent the 
incentives to migrate, the lagged savings ratio represents an important part of the means 
available to carry the costs. With a savings ratio of 1/6 = 16 2/3 % an average family 
                                                 
19
 Note that worker remittances as a share of GDP is a value below unity. Therefore the exponents do not 
have a strong positive impact as for values above one.  
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saves $200 of the maximum of $1200 in our sample or $100 if it is half as rich. Over 
three years this cumulates to $600 or $300. This might be enough to cover migration 
transaction costs, without being payable out of current income. For low savings ratios as 
in the early 1960s the savings ratio explains about 1 percentage point of net emigration. 
For high savings ratios of later years this goes up to 2.5 percentage points.20    
   The classical income difference argument explains most of migration.21 However, in 
terms of economic causality emigration is not possible without the savings accumulated 
in order to cover the costs of migration. We will see below how all regressors interact to 
result in a path of net migration. 
   We have also tried out several other regressors. Population growth rates were 
significant in the regressions of Hatton and Williamson for 11 European countries using 
data for 1860-1913, but are held to be not relevant in the literature on currently 
developing countries (O’Neill (2003)). However, rather than using lagged population 
growth rates as a reason for emigration pressure one can look at current labour force 
growth rates. In the fixed effects version the labour force regressor is highly insignificant 
as in the regressions of Vogler and Rotte (2000) although it is significant in the Arellano-
Bover version of the GMM systems estimator. It seems to be an open issue whether or 
not population and labour growth contributes to emigration. For our simulations below 
results with and without this regressor are very similar. Similarly, a literacy variable is 
significant as long as we do not introduce the remittances variable. Its squared value can 
be made significant if we use two lags as instruments and thereby loose observations for 
8 countries, but using only one lag as instrument we get an insignificant result. When the 
labour force growth is included as well the significance changes depending on which one 
is used with a lag. Pedersen et al. (2006) find that the literacy variable is insignificant for 
migrants going from Africa and Latin America to the OECD. In our sample 27 countries 
are from Africa and two from Latin America. Moreover, we have also tried adding a 
quadratic function of GDP per capita in order to capture more of the spirit of the 
migration hump. These are significant and result in a positive impact of GDPpc on 
                                                 
20
 It is interesting to note that the vertical difference between the interior minimum and the maximum of the 
curve in Figure A2a is about 8 percentage points, for worker remittances as a share of GDP there is a 
difference of 4 percentage points between the highest and the lowest value, and for the savings ratio it is 
1.25 percentage points. Therefore none of these is negligible relative to the others. 
21
 Figure A2c plots this part of the regression for the relevant data range of our simulations below. 
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immigration as in the bivariate regression of Lucas (2005) and in the fixed effects 
regression for Africa in Clark et al. (2007). However, when literacy is introduced the 
variable gets insignificant.22 Because of this lack of robustness we drop them all, literacy, 
labour force growth, and the log of GDP per capita outside the income difference term.23 
The latter aspect of a hump shape in GDP per capita that would indicate the affordability 
of migration is captured in our model by the savings rate. For our purposes it is not 
important what the decomposition of the migrants is. Therefore we do not take into 
account aspects such as age of the population of origin, skills, land ownership and gender 
which are typically discussed in selection models, which respond to different questions 
than ours. One can conclude from the model by Faini and Venturini (1994) that it is not 
necessary to include the costs of stemming immigration in destination countries, because 
this variable drops out in the derivation of the regression equation.24      
   Emigrants leave the labour force of the country of origin. Other emigrants are 
accompanying family members. Others again are immigrating rather than emigrating. As 
we cannot distinguish them in the net migration data we include a net immigration 
variable in an equation explaining the growth of the labour force.25 The result is as 
follows. 
 
D(LOG(L)) = c2i + 0.17D(LOG(L(-1))) +1.39 D(LOG(L(-1)))2 -0.00018 LIT(-13) +0.015 ODA(-5)/GDP(-5)+  
               (0.005)                  (0.005)           (0.025)              (0.09)  
 
+0.04NM/L+ 0.018 D(LOG(GDPPC(-1))).        (2) 
(0.05)     (0.12)  
 
Per.: 4 (1990-2005). Countr.: 43. Obs.:153. SEE: 0.0072. J-stat.: 72.4. Instr.rank:71. p(J): 0.25 
                                                 
22
 In terms of the home bias model by Faini and Venturini (1994) this would mean that the utility function 
is of the Cobb-Douglas type in wages and home amenities and that in the Pareto function on necessary 
characteristics for migration, for example education, the scale parameter x1 does not depend on wages in 
our sample. In their sample consisting of southern European countries  the utility function is CES but not 
CD and the dependence on wages is significant.   
23
 When including quadratic forms of GDP per capita there are two aspects that deserve some attention. 
First, for the migration hump to be an adequate interpretation one should find a maximum value that is not 
implausibly high. Second, for a dynamic interpretation one should make sure that over time migration 
should not grow explosively or have a share in the population or labour force that exceeds unity. These 
points have not been obeyed in all papers discussed above. Adding time trends does compensate for this 
only imperfectly in regard to forward simulations according to our experience.   
24
 For an extensive discussion of international migration theories see Massey et al. (1993).  
25
 In basic growth theory there is a habit to talk about population and not to distinguish between population, 
labour force and employment. Trying to do so of course then requires using the variable that is closest to 
the theoretical concept. This would be the labour input and therefore employment. As we do not have 
employment data to a satisfactory extent we use labour force data as a proxy.   
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Labour force growth depends on its own linear and quadratic lagged values. Literacy as 
of 13 years ago reduces it. This effect probably stems from lower population growth 13 
years earlier. Development aid as of five years earlier also enhances labour force growth. 
This is probably due to emergency aid and poverty alleviation reducing starvation from 
hunger and diseases and thereby allowing people, in particular children, to be in the 
labour force later. Net immigration also increases the labour force immediately, 
indicating that people are allowed to immigrate for the purpose of work. The low 
coefficient though indicates that migration and labour force growth vary largely 
independently from each other. Finally, growth of GDP per capita in the previous year 
encourages people who did not believe in the chance of getting a job to enter the labour 
force. Via net immigration all the effects we have discussed in regard to the previous 
equation also have an impact on the labour force growth. Essentially, net emigration 
would reduce labour force growth and therefore can be expected to be growth rate 
enhancing in an indirect way. Therefore we turn to growth next.  
 
LOG(GDPPC) = c3i + 0.81LOG(GDPPC(-5)) + 0.051 LOG(GFCFGDP) – 0.327 D(LOG(L))  
       (0.0000)    (0.005)     (0.015) 
 
+ 0.52 WR(-1)/GDP(-1) -2.44(WR/GDP)2 -1.1ODA/GDP + 0.365 ODA(-1)/GDP(-1) + 1.61(ODA/GDP)2 
  (0.032)                   (0.0223)        (0.0025)        (0.0001)           (0.0334) 
 
+ 0.196 LOG(WLD) -0.148 LOG(L)         (3) 
(0.0022)          (0.017)  
 
Per.: 30 (1976-2005); Countr.: 48; Obs.: 644. S.E.E.: 0.057; J-stat.: 74.7; Instr.rank: 68; p(J): 0.07. 26 
 
Besides the lagged dependent variable we have used the standard growth variables, the 
log of the investment share or gross fixed capital formation as a share of GDP and the 
labour force growth rate. We have a linear quadratic impact of the (lagged) worker 
remittances as a share of GDP as well as one from development aid. We have checked 
that they are not correlated with the lagged dependent variable if the latter enters as a five 
years lag. Moreover, the reverse causality for aid and remittances are analyzed in 
equation (11) and (40 below. They have a quite different lag structure. As far as Granger 
                                                 
26
 Serial correlation corrections in equations for growth are not included in the reports of the regression 
results or in the simulations below. 
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causality goes we have no reason to expected reverse causality in the growth regression 
for these much debated regressors. In the relevant range remittances have a positive 
impact on growth and aid has a negative one. Aid also has a significantly negative sum of 
coefficients if we drop the quadratic term, a test suggested by Roodman (2008).27 As 
these are effects besides those on investments the growth literature considers them as 
changes of total factor productivity stemming from reallocation (see Feder 1983,) and 
institutional factors. For aid this is plausible because for poor countries much of the aid 
serves emergency and poverty alleviation and some parts are just lost in the political and 
administrative process. These effects may bias the sectoral structure towards 
consumption sectors. Aid also weakens democratic institutions (Djankov et al 2008) 
which may have a negative impact on total factor productivity (Rodriguez 2006). For the 
interpretation of the effect of remittances we saw that they increase net immigration and 
we will see below that they increase savings, investment – these may be the effects 
addressing market imperfections-, reduce taxation but increase public expenditure on 
education.28 The parts invested are included in the investment variable and the 
corresponding equation below and does not appear separately in the growth regression. 
All other effects may have an additional impact on the growth residual through shifting 
the allocation to sectors with higher growth rates. Even if much money goes into 
consumption and/or the distribution becomes more egalitarian it is additional money 
which helps the consumption goods sectors to reap economies of scale.29 Changes in farm 
size and mechanization may increase productivity of agriculture as a by-product of 
investment. Finally, models of growth with imported capital goods (see Bardhan and 
Lewis 1970) consider growth driven by exports. In export demand functions the income 
term could be the GDP of the World, included as log(WLD). As exports per head matter 
here we also include the level of the labour force. Their coefficients are of the same order 
                                                 
27
 The variance inflation factor (VIF) = 1/(1-R2) with R2 from a regression of oda/gdp, log(gdppc(-5), and 
log(l) on all other regressors is high, but not for the other variables. Coefficients of other variables do not 
change much when these are taken out. The significance of the worker remittance variable though falls 
when we take out the quadratic term. However, a loess fit regression of log(gdppc) on wr/gdp without any 
controls shows a mild hump-shaped function, thus justifying the quadratic term. We have also limited the 
data successively to 2004, 2003, 2002, 2001 in order to see whether or not coefficients change strongly. 
They change only slightly and the significance and sign survive always.    
28
 For references to single-country studies of the effects of remittances see Taylor 1999, p.70.  
29
 Massey (1988) briefly discusses aspects of distribution, technical change and scale economies for 
Mexico during several periods.  
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of magnitude and would be closer to each other if we had the lower employment data.30 
Literacy is not significant in this equation.31  
   To bring the growth equation (3) into its broader perspective, the migration dynamics 
have an impact on growth via the labour force growth rate equation. If there is a hump, 
then we expect long cycles in the labour force growth rate, which will produce long 
waves in the growth equation. This will be analyzed below through the simulations using 
the complete system.  
   Another effect of migration is that it causes remittances later. Migration flows have no 
impact though. This can be seen from the following regression for remittances.   
 
WR/GDP = -0.12  -2.95WR(-1)/GDP(-1) -0.08 LOG(1+RIUSA(-1)/100) -12.3 (WR(-1)/GDP(-1))2  
   (0.005) (0.012)       (0.0001)           (0.0079) 
 
-226.15 (WR(-1)/GDP(-1))4   - 0.005(LOG(WR(-1)/GDP(-1))) –7.17 (LOG(WR(-1)/GDP(-1)))-3   (4) 
(0.0003)   (0.0079)           (0.0013) 
 
0.034(LOG(OEC(-2))-LOG(GDPPC(-2))) -0.003(LOG(OEC(-2))-LOG(GDPPC(-2)))2 
(0.06)                           (0.06) 
 
Per.: 34 (1972-2005); Countr.: 51; Obs.: 777. Adj. R2 = 0.926; DW stat.: 2.02. 
 
Worker remittances as a share of GDP depend on its own past values in a slightly non-
linear way.32 As in the migration equation the lagged dependent variable has negative 
                                                 
30
 The standard steady state assumption from growth theory would be a constant share of all variables 
which are expressed as a share of GDP. Under these assumptions taking first differences of equation (3) 
leads to a formula that is familiar from the Bardhan/Lewis model: d(LOG(GDPPC)) =  
0.81d(LOG(GDPPC(-5))) + 0.196d(LOG(WLD)) -0.148d(LOG(L)) = 0.81d(LOG(GDPPC(-5))) + 0.196 
(d(LOG(WLD))- d(LOG(L)) - (0.148 -0.196 )d(LOG(L)). In terms of steady state growth rates this implies 
gy =1.03gw - 0.78gL with gy as the growth rate of the GDP per capita, gw that of the GDP of the World, and 
gL that of the labour force. Inserting our long run result of 3.1% for World GDP growth we get gy  = 0.032 -
0.78gL . Only at a labour force growth rate of 1.64% will our result for poor countries be equal to 1.924%, 
that of the OECD. At a labour force growth rate of 1% we get a growth rate of 2.4%. These are quite 
reasonable results for economies which import their capital goods and therefore are driven by the World 
income term in their export function (see Mutz and Ziesemer 2008 for a theoretical formulation and 
estimation of an explicit growth model without linearization).    
31
 We have abstained from trying other human capital indicators because their endogenization would make 
the model even more complex and in poor countries the variation of literacy is as wide as that of secondary 
schooling. We want to point out though that in the literature all growth regressions for poor countries with 
significant human capital indicators do not employ the export growth part of our regressors although capital 
goods are imported. If exports are skill intensive relative to non-traded goods this may lead to the 
insignificance of the literacy variable.   
32
 When the GDP part of a variable appears with a fraction sign for variables we have composed during the 
estimation, we have algebraic values like 0.02. Then high exponents make them even smaller because they 
are below unity as in the case of wr/GDP. The variables without a fraction sign like peegdp are taken from 
the WDI and 6% then is 6 because the World Bank multiplies them by 100.    
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sign, which is plausible if sending money in one year implies a reduction in the next, be it 
because of the negative correlation of unfavourable shocks or because of the limitations 
in money available. Next, interest rates in the USA (and other countries whose interest 
rates are positively correlated) reduce remittances, indicating that they are also competing 
with investment elsewhere, which is typical for investment oriented expenditures but 
could also hold for others. Finally, the natural log of the income ratio between the OECD 
and the country of origin enhances remittances in a quadratic way. This is compatible 
with several motives, altruistic and others, discussed in the migration literature (Rapoport 
and Docquier 2006). As we first have divergence and then convergence in terms of 
differences of natural logs of income terms this first increases and later decreases 
remittances from this motivation.  
   Remittances as well as development aid are international transfers. They enhance 
disposal income. Depending on the consumption-savings decision this may increase or 
decrease the savings ratio. Savings as a share of GDP (the latter not containing the 
transfers) are almost certainly increasing unless they are inferior or GDP is increasing 
through indirect effects more than savings do. For liquidity or credit constrained 
households we would expect the savings ratio to rise (see Taylor 1999). Therefore we 
look at the savings ratio next.   
 
 
SAVGDP = 5.92 + 0.67 SAVGDP(-1) + 79.1 WR(-1)/GDP(-1) -511.13(WR(-1)/GDP(-1))2 -0.006(PEEGDP)2 
 (0.0001) (0.0000)     (0.013)                 (0.004)                (0.000) 
 
-24.1 ODA/GDP + 40.1(ODA(-1)/GDP(-1))2  + 22NM/L      (5) 
(0.027)                (0.072)   (0.004) 
 
Periods: 7 (1975-2005). Countries: 41. Observations: 106. Adj. R2 = 0.86; DW stat.: 0.85. 
 
The lagged dependent variable has a positive impact. Worker remittances have a positive, 
slightly decreasing effect for twice the relevant range, thus even if remittances were 
doubled. Public expenditure on education (squared) has a slightly negative impact: if the 
government spends more on education households save less. Official development aid 
has a negative impact even if aid were tripled. Finally, an increase in net immigration, or 
less emigration, would increase savings ratios. By implication, if there is an emigration 
hump, growth will enhance emigration and decrease savings in the positively sloped part 
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of the hump and later increase savings via more net immigration; the decrease (increase) 
in savings in turn reduces emigration in equation (1), raising the question whether the 
emigration reducing or the enhancing effect is larger. On the other hand, growth reduces 
remittances according to equation (4) and therefore reduces savings indirectly?33 Again 
we have a high loss of observations from gaps in the data. We also have a low Durbin-
Watson statistic, but we don’t worry about it here because it is probably due to the low 
number of observations in the time dimension when five-year migration data are used. In 
an open economy with strong capital mobility savings are not equal to investment. The 
gap between investment and savings is 6.6% of GDP in our panel and this equals the 
current account deficit, which contains already aid and remittances. The difference 
between them has to be covered by foreign debt flows, which increase over time. The 
estimate for the interest equation is as follows.       
 
LOG(1+RI) = -0.105 + 0.54LOG(1+RI(-1)) -0.28LOG(1+RI(-2)) +  
       (0.023)  (0.00)           (0.00) 
 
+ 0.80(LOG(GDPPC))-LOG(GDPPC(-1)) + 1.57 ODA/GDP-5.83(ODA/GDP)2  
  (0.0004)                                                    (0.004)               (0.00) 
 
0.92(ODA(-1)/GDP(-1))2 + 0.0084[Sum-of-Lags (INVGDP(-2)-SAVGDP(-2))]    (6) 
(0.047)        (t-value: 2.165) 
  
Periods: 25 (1981-2005). Countries: 34. Observations: 406. Adj. R2 = 0.68; DW = 1.95 
 
Real interest rates depend on their own two lagged values. Growth rates of GDP per 
capita enhance them. Official development aid also has a positive impact in the relevant 
range. Probably the reason is that aid signals a weak future ability to pay and therefore 
increases spreads. The difference between investment and savings increases foreign debt, 
and therefore also spreads, with a lag of two years. The result is based on a polynomial 
distributed lag of the eighth degree with 14 lags. We have used polynomial distributed 
lags because past flows of debt are collinear with each other. There are no direct effects 
of remittances on interest rates in the samples.  
                                                 
33
 It is possible to find a regression with positive interest effects on savings. However, in the simulations 
this leads to implausibly high savings rate, which let exceed savings the investment and therefore lead to a 
positive current account for within sample simulations. This is quite unrealistic for the sample period where 
savings are lower than investment in every period.. 
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   Net immigration and remittances have a positive direct effect on savings which reduces 
interest rates. Investments though are independent of interest rates34 or, alternatively 
would have a positive sign, which could be justified by a strong impact of credit rationing 
for a large part of investors. We use the regression without positive interest effect 
because it has a much higher adjusted R-squared and it covers eight countries more. 
Moreover, in our counterfactual exercise the impact of aid on investment and interest 
rates is implausibly large.      
 
LOG(GFCFGDP = 0.52 + 0.776LOG(GFCFGDP(-1)) + 0.45D(LOG(GDPPC(-1))) + 0.27(ODA(-1)/GDP(-1))        
(0.00)  (0.00)                  (0.00)    (0.002) 
 
+ 31.25 D(LOG(L(-1)))^2 - 24.89 LOG(1+D(LOG(L(-1))))^2 + 0.028LIT(-5) -0.0265 LIT(-6)    (7)  
   (0.05)   (0.06)             (0.006)     (0.01)  
 
Periods: 30 (1974-2005). Countries: 43. Observations: 1066. Adj. R2 = 0.86; DW = 1.96 
 
Lagged growth, aid, the growth of employment and the change in literacy have a positive 
impact on investment. There are no direct investment effects of remittances but only 
indirect one from the growth equation. Those of aid may also stem from tying aid to the 
export of donors countries machinery sector.35 Boone (1996) is often cited as finding a 
negative impact of aid on investment. However, he reports positive effects for small 
countries with high aid/GDP ratios, which are generally small and poor countries as many 
in our sample. Emigration, reducing labour force growth, therefore has a negative indirect 
impact on investment here.     
   Literacy had turned out to be an important determinant of labour force growth. It can be 
explained as follows.  
 
LIT = 8.2 + 0.831LIT(-5) + 6.465ODA/GDP + 0.09512 [sum of lags savgdp] + 0.75[sum of lags peegdp] (8) 
         (0.02) (0.00)             (0.063)                     (t-value:1.94)                     (t-value:2.13) 
 
Periods: 18 (1985-2004). Countries: 30; Observations: 171. Adj. R2 = 0.99; DW = 0.81.  
 
                                                 
34
 As the interest rate does ultimately not appear in any of the other equations it has no impact in the system 
of equations. It would only help to calculate the difference between GDP and GNI. 
35
 It is tempting to speculate that whereas governments and bureaucracies tend to bias the effects of aid to 
consumption tying of aid to buying machinery in donor countries may induce the opposite bias towards 
investment. To the best of our knowledge it has not been investigating so far how large these biases are and 
whether or not they can compensate each other.    
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Development aid, savings and public expenditure on education all enhance literacy. For 
savings there are three lags and the current value and for public expenditure on education 
there are four lags and the current value. Polynomial distributed lags are well know to 
cause serial correlation resulting in a low Durbin-Watson statistic here. As all these 
variables are measured as a percentage of the GDP it is interesting to see the differences 
in the coefficients. Development aid has the highest coefficient, because aid, for example 
from the Netherlands, is often tied to education. Probably this induces some reduction of 
private savings being used for this purpose because they have the lowest coefficient. But 
this reduction is still imperfect. There is no complete crowding out of private money and 
we do not know what the coefficient would have been without aid. The effects of 
emigration and remittances on savings presented above have an indirect effect on 
literacy.  
   But what is behind public expenditure on education? This is a highly political variable.  
 
PEEGDP = 0.66+ 0.84 PEEGDP(-1) -0.0226 PEEGDP(-1)2 + 0.04 TAXY + 1.69 ODA(-5)/GDP(-5)  
   (0.015) (0.00)    (0.018)               (0.023)    (0.008) 
 
+ 0.114 LOG(WR(-1)/GDP(-1))        (9) 
(0.0012) 
 
Periods: 25 (1981-2005). Countries: 35. Observations: 219. Adj. R2 = 0.95; DW = 2.07.  
 
 
Public expenditure on education depends on its own lag and a quadratic one with only a 
small coefficient though. The higher the tax ratio the more money goes to education. Aid 
and remittances also induce government to spend more on education. Thus, in the 
policies of the poor countries of our sample these money flows are all complementary in 
regard to education.  
     Another variable that is highly political in spirit is the tax ratio. Our result is as 
follows. 
 
TAXY =  
 
1.3+ 0.83 TAXY(-1) + 0.0012 TAXY(-1)2 – 7.53 WR/GDP + 51.1(WR(-1)/GDP(-1))2 + 0.05 SAVGDP   (10)           
(0.05) (0.00)      (0.018)         (0.09)        (0.0008)      (0.0013) 
 
Periods: 31. Countries: 35. Observations: 348. Adj. R2 = 0.975; DW = 2.02. 
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Tax ratios depend on their own lagged values and a very small quadratic one, which is 
positive. Worker remittances have a negative impact in the relevant range. Via this 
channel remittances reduce education working against the positive effects discussed 
above. But if people save more, indicating a higher surplus product, the tax ratio is also 
increased.   
   Of all the variables, which are important for literacy all but official development aid 
have been discussed so far.  
 
ODA/GDP = 0.016 + 0.82 ODA(-1)/GDP(-1) – 0.0186 d(LOG(GDPPC(-1))) + 0.056 D(LOG(OEC(-2)))  (11) 
      (0.00)    (0.00)   (0.0004)            (0.0007) 
 
Periods: 43 (1963-2005). Countries: 52. Obs.: 1775. Adj. R2 = 0.90; DW = 2.18. 
 
   Aid a s a share of GDP depends on its own lagged value and is negatively dependent on 
the growth rates of the recipient countries and positively on that of the OECD countries, 
the major donors. In other words, aid is reduced if a country is doing better relative to the 
donors. Low growth countries will therefore keep a high share of aid, but high growth 
countries will get less aid over time. This effect is also emphasized by Roodman (2008). 
   The eleven equations provided so far are the heart of the model. In addition, we have 
used US interest rates in equation (4) for remittances, world income in the growth 
equation (3) and OECD income in the migration equation (1) and the aid equation (11). 
For these variables we provide only auxiliary equations as is the habit in dynamic 
stochastic general equilibrium models (see for example Acosta et al 2007). The result of 
the VAR and ECM procedure are the equations presented below. For US interest rates we 
find that they depend only on their own lag.  
 
RIUSA = 0.59 + 0.85RIUSA(-1);         (12) 
          (0.0422) (0.00)             
 
Periods: 43 (1963 -2005). Adj. R2 = 0.718. DW: 1.785 
 
  The growth rate of the world GDP is seen as a function of time mimicking its own 
technical change, its own lag capturing cycles and perhaps the transition to a steady state, 
and the growth rate and its lag of the GDP per capita of the OECD, and the US interest 
rate. 
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LOG(WLD) = 3.31 + 0.0034T +0.89LOG(WLD(-2)) + 1.12D(LOG(OEC)) -0.002394RIUSA   (13) 
 (0.0005)    (0.0015)   (0.00)             (0.00)       (0.0001)   
 
Periods: 43 (1962-2004). Adj. R2 = 0.999; DW = 1.95. 
 
   Finally, for, we regress the log of the GDP per capita of the OECD on a constant, a time 
trend and three lags:  
 
 LOG(OEC) = 1.063 + 1.2LOG(OEC(-1)) - 0.54 LOG(OEC(-2)) + 0.23LOG(OEC(-3)) + 0.00214T  (14) 
    (0.014)  (0.00)         (0.004)             (0.161)        (0.051) 
 
Periods: 43 (1962-2004). Adj. R2 = 0.998; DW = 2.04. 
 
The long run growth rate obtained here is 1.9724, which is essentially the standard value 
in the literature.  
 
Figure 1 over here 
 
Simulation results from estimated equations 
In this section we will provide the results from simulations of the system of fourteen 
differential equations (1)-(14) of the previous section because migration and growth and 
therefore a potentially existing migration hump and depend on several other variables as 
the multiple interacting effects of aid do.  
   In Figure 1 the curve starting at the lowest level on the left is net immigration as a share 
of the labour force.36 Values are first negative and therefore we have emigration. The 
highest emigration is obtained in 1988-1991 at around 0.028. An implication from the 
negative sign of the lagged dependent variable in the migration equation is that the 
increase in emigration in the first phase does not come from self-perpetuating forces. 
Rather three forces are at work here explaining the phase of increasing emigration, the 
crucial and controversial part of the hump. First, after a very early peak of remittances as 
a share of GDP in 1979 (the highest curve in Figure 1) this percentage rate is falling 
                                                 
36
 The values of the first four periods stem from a simple regression on a time trend. These are needed as 
initial values as difference equation (1) has five-year lags. As we have also ten-year lags of remittances, we 
add next lagged dependent variables. This variant of our regression is used until 1983. From 1984 onwards 
we use regression equation (1). The start and end points for the use of the simplified regressions have been 
chosen in a way that minimizes fractions at the points of changes. 
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providing less means for financing the desire to stay at home and solve problems from 
market imperfections. Second, there is only mild convergence of incomes; the income 
gap (see the lowest curve in Figure A3) remains fairly large thereby stimulating further 
emigration.37 Third, savings are increasing and allow financing more emigration. 
However, the income differential changes only slowly, the fall in remittances goes finally 
as far as zero and savings go to a maximum value of almost 20 percent. Therefore all 
three forces work towards increasing emigration until they either slow down and/or run 
into decreasing marginal effects and work against a negative lagged dependent variable.  
    The labour force growth (the second curve from below in Figure 1) follows the net 
immigration curve with a similar but less drastic curvature: When emigration increases, 
labour force growth goes down and when net immigration goes up, labour force growth 
follows. The growth rate (the second curve from above in Figure 1) reacts with the 
opposite tendencies. The interaction among these three variables is the strongest 
interaction in the system.     
   In regard to the savings ratios we see that they follow the path of remittances, which 
first shoot up and then go down again. Tax revenues, going slightly beyond 14 percent of 
GDP, and public expenditure on education as a share of GDP, going a bit higher than 4 
percent, as well as literacy, going to about 80 percent (see Figure A.4), do not reflect any 
of the ups and downs of migration and remittances. They  are not decreasing as much as 
savings do, indicating that the effect of savings is weak although it is significant. Rather 
public expenditure on education as a share of GDP parallels the pattern of total 
investment from very low values to a high and almost constant level, although a value of 
not more than 80 percent is some what disappointing. But this is what is in the data and 
the regression model and getting better performance requires a structural break. 
   In these simulations there are sum aspects which are highly sensitive to changes in the 
regressions, whereas others are very robust. The robustness is present in the first part of 
the migration hump. Slight changes in the regression can switch the point where 
emigration is half its maximum value in the end of our simulations by some decennia. 
This is easy to understand, because now it takes 145 years to get from 2.9 percent net 
                                                 
37
 Another major difference with European migration of that time is that much emigration came from 
relatively rich countries, the UK and its followers. Massey (1988) gives a detailed summary of the reasons 
for the migration into the USA.  
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emigration to 1.4%. That is a long period for a small change. A slight shift of the line 
upward or downward then easily translates into some decennia in the horizontal direction. 
Other aspects that can easily change is the question whether or not savings will exceed 
investment. For example allowing for a positive interest rate in the investment function 
will increase investment, therefore also net debt flows, which in turn will enhance the 
interest rate again. However, this mechanism also increases the effects of more aid to be 
discussed in the next section dramatically and therefore we stick to the choice of an 
investment function presented above. 
 
Comparative statics: The effects of more aid on migration and growth, and their 
determinants 
Effects of aid have been analyzed separately for growth, savings and investment (see 
Doucouliagos, and Paldam (2006, 2008) and in this paper also for labour force growth 
and education variables. Simulation of all equations together integrates the effects of aid 
included in the separate equations. The direct effects are positive for investment, public 
expenditure on education, literacy and, unfavorably, labour force growth, and negative 
for growth and savings. Enhancing aid in simulations can show what happens to 
migration in view of the hump and to the level and growth rates of GDP per capita, which 
is proportional to that of wages in view of the negative direct and positive indirect effects. 
The change in the hump will then depend on all effects of aid on all the regressors of 
migration and growth, all direct and indirect effects through several rounds of feedback 
of our system (1) - (14). In order to get the effects of enhancing aid we double the 
constant of equation (11) from 2006 onwards and repeat the simulations. Next, we divide 
the values from the simulations with the enhanced aid by those of the previous section. A 
value larger than unity indicates an increase of a variable through all the effects of 
doubling aid in the system. ODA as a share of GDP has increased for the countries in our 
sample from 3.3% to 13.7% as a panel average with a standard deviation which is as high 
as the average itself though. In our simulations it goes from about 5.4 percent in 1960 to 
9.7 percent from 1974-1991, a zero growth period of these countries, and then is going 
down slightly during the 1990s when growth resumes after the lost decade to a value of 
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about 9.3 percent in 2005.38 In our simulation the doubling of the value of the intercept of 
equation (11) drives aid to an almost doubled value of 18.4 percent of the GDP in 2033 
where it remains until 2150, our time horizon (see Figure A5). As a consequence of this 
doubling of aid savings fall below 80 percent of their original value, tax rates follow 
savings and go to 89 percent, but investment rates are 12.5 percent higher.39 The 
difference between investment and savings equal the current account, including aid and 
remittances, and is equal to the requirement for new foreign debt. This new indebtedness 
together with the direct effects of aid in the interest equation increases the real interest 
rate by about 10 percentage points. That is a burden for capital users and a gain to the 
domestic and foreign owners. For wage earners and the unemployed though the effect on 
the GDP is crucial because unemployment and wages develop proportionally with output 
as often modeled by use of marginal productivity conditions. 
   Labour force growth is also directly influenced by the doubling of aid. It goes up with 
aid, the growth rate and net immigration and down with literacy. First the positive effects 
dominate and later it goes down because it follows the falling GDP per capita growth 
rates and net immigration, both shown in Figure 2. As the effects of growth and net 
immigration get weaker, the direct effect of aid s responsible for keeping the growth rate 
of the labour force higher than is baseline value. GDP per capita growth first goes up 
because investment growth is much earlier than that of the labour force. When labour 
force growth gets strong, GDP per capita growth rates go down. Later on when labour 
force growth rates go down but investment remains high GDP per capita growth rates 
return to their old value. When the effect of doubling aid on the GDP per capita is 
strongest, the additional 9 percent of aid as a share of the GDP buy a maximum of 5.6 
percent higher GDP per capita. This may be perceived as a low return, but given the large 
amounts that go to non-investment purposes as witnessed by the fall in the savings ratio, 
this is a non-negligible amount especially in poor countries with priorities more in the 
present than in the future as favoured by growth considerations. Whereas aid saves lives 
and therefore increases the labour force, which is good for welfare but bad for growth, 
                                                 
38
 There is only a mild effect of the break down of communism on aid in our sample and less so in our 
simulations. 
39
 See Figure A.6 where the ratios of the values with and without doubling of aid go to 0.77, 0.895 and 
1.125 for savings, taxes and investment respectively. 
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literacy has the merit of keeping the growth of the labour force down, although it is not 
the dominant force here. The dominant force of getting GDP per capita high is that of aid 
on investment which is strongly positive for our sample.   
FIGURE 2 OVER HERE 
   A direct impact of aid appears in the equations for literacy and public expenditure on 
education (see Figure A.7). Literacy increases slowly over the whole horizon to be 4 
percent higher in the end. Public expenditure on education is 6-10 percent higher. Both 
go up in a similar way as investment and population growth but much less strongly so, 
because the negative effects of savings and taxes work against this. Then, in the equation 
for public expenditure on education the log of the remittance ratio appears; it goes 
through a hump shaped development as GDP per capita does when aid doubles40. 
Remittances actually develop through aid in a way that is inversely symmetric to the 
increase in GDP per capita (see Figure A.8). 
  Finally, we can come to the migration hump. Net immigration as a share of the labour 
force is plotted twice in Figure 3, once with and once without the doubling of aid. The 
lower curve repeats that in Figure 1. The higher curve is valid after the doubling of aid. 
Emigration goes down by more than 14 percent through the decrease in savings. As aid 
and additional national means go into consumption in order to improve the conditions of 
living the means for emigration are reduced and so probably is the desire to emigrate 
because of the improved conditions of living. The often claimed effect of higher growth 
through aid is present but the overall effect on migration is not in accordance with the 
idea of growth leading to higher emigration, but rather the hump curve shifts to lower 
values of emigration. The effects of aid reducing savings and enhancing growth via larger 
investment dominates that of lower remittances.      
FIGURE 3 OVER HERE 
  In sum, the unfavourable effects of aid on savings and the labour force growth and even 
the negative direct effects in growth regressions are all outweighed for the countries41 and 
period under consideration by the positive impacts of aid on investment and education. 
                                                 
40
 This is due to the fact though that the log is taken from a number smaller than unity, thus getting 
negative. 
41
 For a richer sample we find positive effects of aid on savings. This difference in results for different 
samples may explain why researchers in the past got opposite results depending on the samples 
investigated.   
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All effects taken together GDP per capita is higher until 2127, for 120 years from the 
assumed doubling of aid in 2006. In addition emigration would be reduced for more than 
130 years by about 9 percent, ranging between zero and 14.5%. If there is a desire to 
reduce emigration in the host and donor countries, this is an effect in addition to that on 
education and growth especially if people have a home preference (see Faini and 
Venturini 1993, 1994). But if rich countries have plans to reduce emigration this may 
viewed as a minor contribution and control are likely to be more effective.                     
  
Summary, conclusion and suggestions for further research 
We have estimated equations for migration, GDP per capita growth, labour force growth, 
remittances, aid, savings, investment, interest rates, literacy, tax revenues and public 
expenditure on education for poor developing countries with GDP per capita below 
$1200 (in constant prices of the year 2000) using dynamic panel data methods. Some of 
these regressions depend on US interest rates, the GDP per capita in the OECD countries, 
and the GDP of the World for which we have estimated simple auxiliary regressions. The 
major results from the regressions are as follows. In the migration equation we find that 
remittances enhance net immigration or reduce emigration. In the growth equation 
remittances enhance growth rates. Moreover, remittances enhance savings and public 
expenditure on education, but reduce tax revenues, all as a share of GDP. Net 
immigration enhances labour force growth and the savings ratio. Official development 
aid decreases the savings ratio and the per capita GDP growth rate, but it increases 
investment, public expenditure on education and literacy and labour force growth.  
   Then we used the deterministic part of the system of these equations to simulate the 
development until 2150. The size of the model in terms of numbers of equations is closer 
to those of econometric VAR models than to those of traditional large macroeconomic 
models. As a result we find that there is a migration hump with a first peak around 1990, 
which is also found using a simple quadratic time trend. The increasing part of the hump 
is driven by an increase in savings ratio since 1960. As the first of three peaks is just 
behind us for the average of the panel further dis-aggregation into smaller panels and 
country-specific time-series analysis might show which countries are in the critical phase 
of the hump. As long as there is increasing emigration, labour force growth rates are 
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reduced and this increases the growth rate of the GDP per capita. When emigration rates 
fall, labour force growth rises and GDP per capita growth rates and remittances as share 
of the GDP fall as well. This is the major impact on GDP per capita growth rates and 
levels in connection with the effects of education on labour force growth and with those 
from investment and growth.  
   As it has been suggested among other things to double aid in (UN 2005) we do so in a 
counterfactual simulation of our estimated model. Among the effects on GDP per capita 
levels and growth rates the positive ones on investment and education dominate the 
result, although the savings and tax ratios are falling. Only later when the labour force 
growth is increasing we get negative effects on the growth rate of the GDP per capita 
after 50 years which make level effects negative after 120 years from the first increase in 
aid. The fall in the savings shifts the migration hump towards lower emigration values for 
more than 140 years and to lower values of net immigration for the later time. Overall, 
we come to the more optimistic results in regard to the effects of aid on migration exactly 
because aid has negative effects on savings. In open economies with high indebtedness 
savings are relatively independent from investments. We get optimistic results in regard 
to the effects of aid on the GDP per capita growth rates and levels because the indirect 
effects of aid on growth via investment and education are positive and dominating. Even 
with a doubling of aid there remains quite a lot of migration going on according to Figure 
3. Whether or not a doubling of aid is realistic can be left to the reader.     
   All these results are possible only because we go away from the methodology of 
drawing conclusions form single equation regressions but rather we integrate several 
regressions into a simultaneous model of difference equations allowing us to analyze the 
effects of all variables in the system on migration and growth and also of all effects of aid 
on all variables simultaneously. This leads to an endogenous migration hump rather than 
one from coefficients of a single regression equation only. The consequence of the 
endogeneity is that the whole hump can shift and actually does so when aid is changed in 
counterfactual simulations. In regard to aid we can analyze the consequences of its direct 
effects on savings, investment, interest rates, education variables, labour force growth 
and GDP per capita for all its indirect effects on all other variables, in particular growth 
rates and levels of GDP per capita growth. An approximate doubling of aid moves the 
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migration hump to lower values of emigration and GDP per capita to higher values for 
more than a hundred years. 
    Hopefully domestic and international policies will achieve a structural break towards 
aid-free development before the negative effects show up after 120 years.      
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Appendix A: List of Countries 
Countries with GDP per capita below $1200 (2000):  
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Benin, Bolivia, Burkina Faso, Cambodia, Cameroon, 
Comoros, Congo Rep., Cote d'Ivoire, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, 
Honduras, India, Indonesia, Kenya, Kyrgyz Republic, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, 
Mali, Mauritania, Moldova, Mongolia, Mozambique, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, 
Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Sri Lanka,  
Sudan, Syria, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Uganda, Ukraine, Vanuatu, Yemen, Zimbabwe. 
 
Appendix B: Data 
All data are taken from the WDI (World Development Indicators). We include 108 
countries selected by the criterion of having at least one dollar of remittances received in 
one of the recent years, receive development aid and have data for literacy and GDP. 
Next, we divide this sample into those above and under (constant 2000) $1200 GDP per 
capita, a12 and u12. The reason is that we found in earlier work that the 70 countries 
below $1200 have no growth in a panel average when looking at the period 1960 to 2003. 
The sample a12 contains 56 countries and the sample u12 consists of 52 countries. We 
estimate the model for the poorer sample.    
   The data on remittances are official receipts in constant 2000 US$.42 Flows going via 
financial investments and withdrawals from related accounts are not included (see IMF 
2005, p.99). Unofficial receipts may be high - Freund and Spatafora (2005) estimate that 
informal remittances are between 35 and 75% of the official ones - and important but we 
have no way to deal with the issue directly43 (see Adams and Page 2005).44 Remittance 
data are available for all 52 countries but only since 1971. GDP per capita data are 
                                                 
42
 In the WDI there are surprisingly many zero values, which are quite implausible because they are 
preceded and followed by positive values of non-negligible size. We have turned them into ‘non available’.  
43
 Panel data on remittance fees, which cause unofficial receipts, would be an interesting addition here. But 
we are not aware of their availability.   
44
 We would like to point out though that GDP data also underestimate economic activity because of the 
neglect of the informal sector. Schneider and Enste (2000, Table 2) report values of 25-76% of GDP for 
developing countries. This is the same order of magnitude as for remittances. For developed countries these 
values are lower. Informal remittances are falling as a share of the official ones. It is not clear though that 
the share of the informal sector is falling in developing countries over time. The imperfection of 
remittances data is broadly discussed in all related papers. That of GDP data is not discussed anymore 
although it may be as severe. 
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available for all 52 countries and 46 periods, but with some gaps: instead of 52x46 = 
2392 we have only 1957 observations. Savings data start in 1965 with gaps again, leaving 
us with 1423 observations instead of 41x52=2132. As a consequence we loose more than 
half the possible observations in both dimensions.  Data of the GDP per capita, gdppc and 
OEC are in constant 2000 US$ and stem from national accounts. Interest rates, ri and 
rius, are real rates as obtained by use of the GDP deflator and taken from the IMF IFS 
Yearbook into the WDI data. Savings, savgdp, are gross national savings from national 
accounts, calculated as GDP minus consumption, plus net current transfers and factor 
income from abroad and expressed as a share of GDP.45 As investment, invgdp, relates to 
the demand of net debt flows we use gross capital formation (formerly gross domestic 
investment) as a percent of GDP. The major difference with gross fixed capital formation 
as a share of GDP, gfcfgdp, is the inventories, which are not investments that add to the 
capital stock as usually written into a production function. All savings and investment 
data come from the national accounts. Literacy data, lit, from the UNESCO are available 
in the WDI. Data on public expenditure on education, peegdp, are from the UNESCO and 
we take those of several versions of the World Development Indicators.46 Data on official 
development aid include loans containing at least a grant element of 25%. Data on net 
immigration flows are five-year estimates of the United Nations Population Division. 
Labour force data are from the ILO.  
 
Appendix C: Instrumental variables 
This appendix provides the list of instruments used in the regressions, starting with the 
number of the respective regressions. The first number after a variable gives the first lag 
used and the second the last lag. These are used as dynamic instruments (see Baltagi 
(2005, Chap.8). If only one lag is mentioned we have a simple standard instrument.    
 
(1): NM(-10)/L(-10), NM(-15)/L(-15), ((LOG(GDPPC)-LOG(OEC)),-1,-1),  
((LOG(GDPPC) -LOG(OEC))2,-1,-1), ((LOG(GDPPC)-LOG(OEC))3,-1,-1), ((WR/GDP)2,-1,-3),  
WR(-10)/GDP(-10),  (WR(-5)/GDP(-5))2, (WR(-10)/GDP(-10))2, SAVGDP(-3).  
 
(2): ( D(LOG(L)),-2,-7),  (D(LOG(L))2,-2,-7), ODA(-5)/GDP(-5), LIT(-13), NM(-5)/L(-5), 
D(LOG(GDPPC(-1), -1,-5))  
                                                 
45
 Using savings as share of GNI does not change regression results here. As we need investment as a share 
of GDP in the growth regression, we use also savings as a share of GDP.  
46
 The versions since 2005 cover only data since 1998. 
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(3): (LOG(GDPPC),-5,-5), (LOG(GFCFGDP),-1,-1), D(LOG(L)), WR(-1)/GDP(-1),  
(WR(-1)/GDP(-1))2, ODA(-1)/GDP(-1), (ODA(-1)/GDP(-1))2 LOG(WLD(-1)), LOG(L(-1)), 
LOG(GDPPC(-1))-LOG(GDPPC(-6)), LOG(GDPPC(-2))-LOG(GDPPC(-7)). 
 
The last two instruments in equation (3) are identical to the regressors added for serial 
correlation correction. They are not reported in the text and not included in the 
simulations.  
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Figure 1: The Migration hump, labour force 
growth, GDP per capita growth and remittances 
as a share of GDP in poor developing countries 
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Figure 2: Level and growth rate of GDP per capita and 
labour force growth 
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Figure 3: Net immigration as a share of the labour force with 
and without enhancement of aid
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Lower line: Baseline simulation. Higherer line: with doubling of aid.
 
 
 
 45 
 
Appendix: List of abbreviations  
 
ci   constant of equation i 
CD  Cobb-Douglas 
CES  Constant elasticity of substitution 
D,d   first difference operator 
DSGE  Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium Model 
DW  Durbin-Watson statistic 
ECM  Error Correction Model 
EGLS  Estimated Generalized Least Squares 
er  emigration rate 
GDP  Gross Domestic Prod 
gdppc  Gross Domestic Product per capita 
gfcfgdp  gross fixed capital formation as a share of GDP times 100 
GLS  Generalized least squares 
GMM  Generalized Method of Moments 
GNI  Gross National Income 
HAC  heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent 
invgdp  Gross investment as a share of GDP times 100 
J-statistic Hansen-Sargan function minimized by GMM  
l  labour force measured as number of workers 
LDC  less developed country 
lit  percentage of the population above 15 which can read and write 
log  natural logarithm  
manugdp  share of manufactures in GDP 
nm/l  net immigration per worker 
oda/GDP official development aid as a share of GDP 
oec  GDP per capita of the OECD countries 
OLS  ordinary least squares 
PCSE  Panel Corrected Standard Errors 
pdl  polynomial distributed lag 
peegdp  public expenditure on education as a share of GDP times 100  
ri  real interest rate  
riusa  real interest rate in the USA times 100. 
savgdp  savings as a share of GDP times 100. 
S.E.E.  standard error of estimation 
SUR  Seemingly unrelated regression 
T  time trend, @trend 
t  t according to student distribution 
taxy  tax revenue as a share of GDP times 100. 
VAR  Vector Autoregressive Regression  
WDI  World Development Indicators 
wld  GDP of the world 
wr  worker remittances 
wr/GDP worker remittances as a share of GDP 
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Appendix: Figures A.1-10  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A1 Net immigration is expected to have a minimum after thirty two years, 1991, 
and to vanish after seventy years, 2030, according to quadratic time trend estimation. 
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Figure A2a The partial effect of long-run convergence (moving from left to right; after a 
temporary divergence from -3.4 to -3.67) between the per capita income of poor countries 
and that of the OECD decreases emigration. The data until 2006 are in the negatively 
sloped range of -3.38 and -3.67.   
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Figure A2b Worker remittances as a share of GDP enhance net immigration as a share of 
the labour force.   
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Figure A2c The savings ratio reduces net immigration by about 1 percentage point at low 
values and by 2 percentage points at high values.  
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Figure A.3: Catching up, savings and investment 
as a share of GDP
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Figure A.4: Tax revenue and public expenditure 
on education as a share of GDP, and literacy 
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Figure A.5: ODA/GDP simulation with 
enhancement since 2006
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Figure A.6: Aid, savings, investment and tax 
revenues as a share of GDP 
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Figure A.7: Literacy, public expenditure on education as a 
share of GDP and the log ratio of remittances
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Figure A.8: Worker remittances as a share of GDP: Ratio 
with/without enhancement of aid
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Appendix  
Table A.1 
Forecast quality indicators for fixed effect versions of the regressions
Equation No. dependent variable Theil index Covariance proportion
1 nm 0.126 0.98
2 d(log(L)) 0.1 0.89
3 log(gdppc) 0.0068 0.999
4 wr/GDP 0.084 0.93
5 savgdp 0.074 0.977
6 log(1+ri) 0.28 0.917
7 log(gfcfgdp) 0.044 0.82
8 lit 0.007 0.97
9 peegdp 0.076 0.897
10 taxy 0.068 0.99
11 oda/gdp 0.17 0.96
12 riusa 0.138 0.92
13 log(wld) 0.00002 0.974
14 log(oec) 0.00087 0.937
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